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Abstract
Many empirical studies have found both inter-industry
and intra-industry externalities in the form of local
knowledge spillovers in research. This paper makes some
assumptions reflecting these empirical regularities in order
to analyse their implications for the allocation of economic
activities between two regions. The two main assumptions are
that R&D guarantees a positive equilibrium rate of growth in
the volume of output by increasing the marginal productivity
of labour, and that it is characterised by geographically
bounded intra-industry as well as inter-industry knowledge
spillovers. The existence of an iceberg type cost in
transporting consumption goods from one region to the other,
together with increasing returns to scale in production,
introduces a centripetal force; this is opposed by a
centrifugal force associated with congestion costs: agents
living in crowded areas suffer a reduction in their level of
utility. In equilibrium, different locations of research and
manufacturing firms can result. Where transport costs are
higher (congestion costs lower), centripetal forces dominate
and all economic activities end up concentrated in one region.
As transport costs decrease (congestion costs increase), an
equilibrium with activities in both regions becomes more
likely.
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(*) Bank of Italy, Research Department.1. Introduction
1
Since the beginning of the decade there has been a
revival of interest in the study of economic geography,
fostered by the application of new theoretical results in the
analysis of economies with static and dynamic increasing
returns to scale, (e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Romer,
1986).
2 The main feature shared by the majority of models of
the so called “new economic geography” literature is the joint
assumption Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition among firms
offering differentiated goods and transport costs for
transferring goods from one location to another. As it has
first been shown by Krugman (1991a, 1991b), within this
framework two centripetal forces emerge: backward linkages,
inducing firms to locate production where the demand for their
products is largest, and forward linkages, urging workers to
live where real wages, which are a decreasing function of
transport costs, are higher.
3
The contribution of this paper to the literature is to
model explicitly the interaction between increasing returns in
manufacturing and local externalities in research, in a
framework characterised by perfect labour mobility. The
existence of positive knowledge spillovers in R&D is a well
accepted result of empirical research (e.g. Jaffe, 1986, 1989;
                                                       
1 I would like to thank Keith Blackburn, Victor Hung, Andrew Mountford,
Gianmarco Ottaviano, Morten Ravn and Oreste Tristani for their
suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this paper, and
seminar participants at the University of Southampton, at the Bank of
Italy and at the 1997 European Meeting of the Econometric Society.
All remaining errors are my own. The opinions expressed do not
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.
2 The origins of theoretical thinking on location of economic
activities can be attributed to von Thünen's book The Isolated State,
first published in Germany in 1826. Among other early contributions
are Christaller (1933), Lösch (1940), Mills (1967,  1972) and Jacobs
(1969).
3 Hirschmann (1958) was the first author to analyse this aspect.8
Caballero and Lyon, 1990, 1992; Nadiri, 1993). More recently,
the geographic dimension of this phenomenon has been confirmed
by the studies of Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993),
Feldman (1994), Henderson (1994), Audretsch and Feldman
(1996). Glaeser et al. (1992), Shea (1995, 1996), Henderson,
Kuncoro and Turner (1995), although not attributing them
explicitly to R&D activity, have found evidence of the
existence of both inter-industry and intra-industry
geographically bounded positive spillovers in manufacturing.
This paper shows that when such externalities are present
different patterns of location can result, depending on the
interaction between transport and congestion costs.
The basic framework of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition interacting with transport costs has been applied
to the study of many aspects of the optimal location of
economic activities: the effects of trade liberalisation on
the size of third world metropolises (Elizondo and Krugman,
1992), the relationship between geography and trade (Asilis
and Rivera-Batiz, 1994; Puga and Venables, 1998), the effects
of the reduction of transport costs on income convergence
across countries and on the patterns of geographical
specialisation (Krugman and Venables, 1995, 1996), the
consequences of vertical and horizontal integration at the
industry level (Venables, 1996; Ekholm and Forslid, 1997), the
role of services (de Vaal and van den Berg, 1997) and the
dynamics of urbanisation (Puga, 1996a).
4
All these models consider the effects of static
economies of scale and are characterised by the existence of a
steady-state equilibrium with a constant level of production.
A more recent strand of the literature, to which this paper is
                                                       
4 A stimulating framework that includes many earlier models as subcases
has been proposed by Puga (1996b). Two recent comprehensive surveys
are those by Fujita and Thisse (1996) and by Ottaviano and Puga
(1997).9
more closely related, has studied the relationship between the
location of economic activities and the equilibrium rate of
growth of the economy. Bertola (1993) analyses the effects of
integration between two regions within an AK model of growth
extended to allow for labour as a factor of production; his
main conclusion is that integration does not necessarily lead
to a better allocation of resources, or to a higher rate of
growth. Walz (1995), using the theoretical framework of
Romer’s (1990) model of R&D and growth, studies the optimal
location of research firms in a two-country economy. In his
model knowledge spillovers are not geographically bounded and
therefore there is no correlation between the equilibrium rate
of growth and alternative patterns of location of the economic
activities. In Martin and Ottaviano (1996), who also adopted
Romer’s framework, this correlation is present: with no labour
mobility, higher concentration fosters growth by making the
inputs for R&D activity less expensive.
The theoretical framework adopted in this paper is
partly different from that of the model just mentioned. The
two main assumptions are that R&D guarantees a positive
equilibrium rate of growth in the volume of output by
increasing the marginal productivity of labour, and that it is
characterised by geographically bounded intra-industry as well
as inter-industry knowledge spillovers. The existence of an
iceberg-type cost in transporting consumption goods from one
region to the other, together with increasing returns to scale
in production, introduces a centripetal force; this is opposed
by a centrifugal force: agents living in crowded areas suffer
a reduction in their level of utility owing to congestion
costs (for example higher house prices). The model is
characterised by both backward and forward linkages (although
of a slightly different kind from those emerging from Krugman-
type models): workers prefer to live where the majority of
firms are located, as the prices of consumption goods are10
lower, but thus suffer from higher congestion costs, which can
be sustained only if more firms are attracted to the region.
In equilibrium, which is achieved when all workers
share the same level of utility, different locations of
research and manufacturing firms can result. For higher
transport costs (lower congestion costs), centripetal forces
dominate and all economic activities end up concentrated in
one region. As transport costs decrease (congestion costs
increase), an equilibrium with activities in both regions
becomes more likely.
5 Moreover, when production is not
necessarily located in the same region as research (i.e., R&D
and manufacturing firms are not vertically integrated),
research firms concentrate in just one region and, by
internalising all the geographically bounded spillovers that
characterise this activity, achieve a higher equilibrium rate
of growth of the level of technology.
The rest of the paper is organised in five parts. The
next section describes the basic structure of the model.
Section 3 derives the long-run equilibrium and the optimal
allocation of economic activities between the two regions.
Section 4 makes some considerations on the effects of
integration on welfare and income distribution. The final
section concludes.
2. The model
The model adapts the quality-ladder model of Grossman
and Helpman (1991) to the case where there are two regions and
where there are regional knowledge spillovers. The two regions
are populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived agents
(normalised to lie in the [0,1] interval) who maximise their
                                                       
5 This result is similar to Helpman (1995); for an empirical
justification see, for example, Krugman (1991b), p. 81, Table 3.4.11
utility over a fixed set of consumption goods. The supply side
of the economy is composed of a fixed number of industries,
each producing a differentiated consumption good, and an
endogenous number of R&D firms, one in each industry, which
compete to become, in the next period, the technology leader
and the only producer of that industry's consumption good.
There are only two factors of production, unskilled and
skilled labour. The former is employed only in manufacturing,
the latter only in the research sector. Each worker offers
inelastically a fixed amount of labour and uses the revenues
from his activity to maximise an intertemporal utility
function over the amount of goods consumed.  The  share  of
workers in each group is exogenous. The solution of the model
is a dynamic competitive equilibrium in which the location of
economic activities and the rate of growth in the volume of
output are endogenously determined.
2.1 Demand side
Every worker, whether skilled or unskilled, uses the
revenues from his activity to maximise the following
intertemporal utility function:
6















subject to the budget constraint:
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6 As the two regions are identical, for any equilibrium location of
activities there also exists a perfectly symmetric alternative. In
the following, unless stated otherwise, all choices are considered
from the point of view of agents and firms located in region A.12
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is the total population living in region A,  () ci t
SA  is the
consumption of the generic good i produced in region S (for
S=A,B) and consumed in region A, s  is the subjective rate of
time preference,  Pi t
AA , ()is the price of the generic good
produced and consumed in A,  Pi t
BA , ()is the price in A of a good
produced in B, Wt
IA is the nominal wage for labour of type I
(I=H,L) in region A, rt  is the rate of interest on a safe
asset and a0 is the initial level of nominal wealth of each
agent. The term  ( ) J ln 1+ Zt
A  represents the congestion costs
associated with life in crowded areas (e.g. the cost of
housing or the negative externalities of pollution).
7
The solution of the maximisation problem in (1) gives









































nominal expenditure of a representative agent I. From the
assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences, it follows that agents
devote a fixed share of their total expenditure to each good.
Total demand for good i can be obtained by adding the
quantities demanded by each agent in each region:
                                                       
7 This cost is similar to that introduced by Henderson (1974) and Gali
(1994). Instead of assuming its existence, it could have been derived
as, for example, it is done by Mills (1967), Elizondo and Krugman
(1992) and Eaton and Eckstein (1994), who assume that the price of
the land on which workers live decreases with the distance from the
centre of each region. However, this would have had the effect of
complicating the exposition of the basic features of the model,
without adding any insight to the analysis.13
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HS =+  is the total expenditure in region S and
Ht and  Lt  are respectively the total number of skilled and
unskilled workers.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), there are no
monetary variables in the model, so that any numeraire can be
chosen. Their approach is follows and it is assumed that total




B =+= 1 . With free capital mobility interest rates must
be equalised. From the solution of the maximisation problem
(1) the nominal interest rate is also constant, and equal to




















IS t =+ = - = + 1 0 s
As will be made clear later, in equilibrium nominal
wages are also constant.
2.2 Supply side
The supply side of the economy is a simplified version
of Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) quality ladder model. In each
period there exists a fixed number of industries producing a
different, non-storable good i (for=1,...,nt ). Within each
industry a number mi t () of R&D firms carry on a costly research
activity aimed at improving the technology used in production.
In each period only one research firm finds a profitable way
of increasing productivity in manufacturing; as a result it
becomes the technology leader. Having a technological
advantage with respect to other potential manufacturers, this
firm can set the price at a level at which it is the only one14
producing the industry’s good with non-negative profits (i.e.,
as in Grossman and Helpman, Bertrand competition is assumed).
Given free entry to research, for each industry i, the number
mi t () of firms in the R&D sector is endogenously determined.
Every unit chooses the number of workers to employ in order to
maximise profits, discounting it by the probability of
becoming the technology leader. The number of firms in
equilibrium is determined by the condition that no firms make
positive profits. In each period there are thus n







(=mn tt , by symmetry) R&D firms doing research with the
objective of becoming the next period’s technology leader.
2.2.1 Manufacturing sector
All goods are produced using a technology which is
linear in its only input: unskilled labour. Starting
production requires the payment of a fixed cost (k ) which can
be expressed in labour units:






where  () Xi t
A  is the output level of the generic industry i in
region  A,  () rt
A i  is the marginal productivity of labour in
region  A (which reflects the level of technology reached in
industry i) and  () li t
A  is the amount of unskilled labour used in
the production of good i in region A.
Goods produced in A can be sold in B, but as is common
in the new economic geography literature it is assumed that in
order to do this a transport costs must be paid. This cost
takes the iceberg form first introduced by Samuelson (1954):15
for a quantity  () Xi t
B  of good i to be imported from B and
consumed in A, a quantity  () Xi t
B t  must be produced (with t³1).
The Cobb-Douglas form of our utility function implies
that consumers spend a fixed amount of their total income on
each good. Given Bertrand competition between manufacturers,
the transport costs are therefore paid entirely by consumers.















In the R&D sector firms carry on research with the
objective of becoming the next period's technology leader.
Their probability of success is an increasing function of the





















where  () hi j t
A, is the amount of skilled labour employed by
research firm j of industry i in region A,  () mi t  is the total
number of R&D firms in industry i (which is determined
endogenously),  () ( )
()






 is the total amount of skilled
labour devoted to R&D in industry i and  () eÎ01 ,  is a parameter
measuring the elasticity of the probability of success with
respect to the amount of skilled labour.
We assume that the technology used for production in
previous periods is freely available in both regions. Its rate
of improvement  g A t r ,  (which coincides with that of the marginal
productivity of labour in manufacturing) is a positive
function of the number of workers employed in the previous16
period by the winning firm,  () hi j t
A,. As stated earlier, research
is assumed to be characterised by both intra-industry regional
externalities (proxied by the total number of R&D firms in the
industry located in the same region,  () mi t
A ) and inter-industry
regional externalities (proxied by the total number of
industries that locate at least one R&D firm in the same
region,  nt
RA).
8 The technology is therefore the following:










t ii h i j m i n i +- =+ 11 ,
where  abg ,,> 0  are parameters describing the elasticity of the
technological improvement relative, respectively, to the
amount of skilled labour employed, intra-industry spillovers
and inter-industry spillovers, and x is a positive constant.
9
As for manufacturing, starting the R&D activity
requires the payment of a fixed cost, m , which is also
expressed in labour units. The profit function for the generic
firm  j of industry i, located in region S and deciding to
produce in A is therefore:

































2.2.3 Supply side equilibrium
With Bertrand competition, the assumption that the
technology used in the previous period is freely available
implies that the leading firm cannot set a price higher than
                                                       
8 Assuming positive but limited spillovers between the two regions
would have made the analysis more cumbersome, without modifying the
basic results.
9 Although this function displays decreasing returns to scale in
labour, it nevertheless guarantees a constant rate of growth because
of its linearity in the level of knowledge.17





















Profit-maximising firms will always set a price
satisfying this condition as an equality. Substituting (8)
into the profit function (7), together with the expressions
for the probability of winning the R&D race (5) and the
research technology (6), it is possible to obtain:
(9) () () ( ) ()
( )
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Maximising this profit function with respect to the
number of workers devoted to research and assuming free entry
to the research sector of each industry, it is possible to










Substituting this expression into (5), it becomes
evident that the probability of winning the technology race is
the same for all firms within the same industry, and that the
number of R&D firms, identical in all industries, depends on
the parameters describing the technology for research and on









particular, the higher the fixed cost that has to be paid to
start research, the lower the number of R&D firms and, owing
to fewer intra-industry spillovers, the lower the equilibrium
rate of growth of total output.18
3. Geographical equilibrium
3.1 Workers’ location
In the two-region economy real wages would always be
higher if activities were concentrated, as this would imply
that no transport costs have to be paid. However, agents
living in an area with a higher population density suffer a
loss of utility, owing to the congestion costs. Given free
labour mobility, in equilibrium the utility of agents living
in the two regions must be equalised; moreover, such an
equilibrium is stable only if agents moving to a different
location do not increase their level utility.
Substituting the level of consumption which maximises











, ()= , into the instantaneous
utility function, it is possible to obtain each worker’s
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- ,, ll 1  is the price level in region A, ci t
IS A , ()
is the consumption of the generic good i produced in region A
by a worker of type I living in region S,  () Pi t
AS ,  is the price








=  is the share of goods produced in region A.
The willingness of workers to move from one region to
the other depends on the level of utility that they can
achieve by living in the two places: it is therefore a




AA ,, () () =  for S=A and  PiPi t
AS
t
AA ,, () () =t  for S=B.19
function of the differences in the price level, congestion
costs and nominal income. Appendix 1 shows that nominal wages
can never differ too much between the two regions, as
otherwise firms would prefer to change location; in the
following, it is assumed that they are equalised (a possible
justification could be that this results from collective
bargaining). This assumption is almost irrelevant, however: in
Appendix 2 it is shown that when nominal wages are not
equalised only the parameter space for wich there are
symmetric or asymmetric equalibria changes, while the number
of possible equlibria is unchanged. From equation (11) it is


















































where  DLt is the amount of unskilled labour wishing to move
from A to B and  () g· is any well behaved, strictly increasing
function such that  () g00 =  (in the following it is assumed that
() gx x = ).
In equilibrium the utility of workers in the two
regions must be equalised at each point in time. In fact, any
equilibrium in which the overall utility is equalised but
there are differences in the level reached at each point in
time would not be time consistent.
11 Substituting the
equilibrium price of goods (8) into (12), the condition under
which workers do not have an incentive to move is given by the
following expression, which makes it possible to solve
                                                       
11 Due to the absence of migration costs, workers would in fact find
optimal to move to the region where they obtain the highest possible
level of utility, even for just one period.20


























In order to solve the model it is only necessary to
find a relationship between the number of manufacturing and
research firms in each region and the number of workers.
3.2 R&D and production location
3.2.1 Location of production independent of that of R&D
Under the assumption that firms can choose where to
locate production independently of where they have conducted
the research activity, it is easier to solve the model by
first determining the optimal location of research firms.
Substituting the equilibrium number of workers in each
































This expression clearly shows that profits increase
both with the number of research firms within the same
industry locating in the same region ( () mi t
S ), and with the
number of industries locating at least one research firm in
that region (nt
RS , ). Assuming that manufacturing can take place
in either A or B, independently of where the research activity
that led to success in the R&D race in the previous period was
located, the only stable equilibrium such that all firms have
the same expected profits is with the entire research sector
located in the same region. All the other equilibria with
profit equalisation and R&D firms in both regions are21
unstable. In the case of a symmetric equilibrium with the same
number of industries locating research in each region, each
firm has an incentive to change location, as this would
increase the spillovers from which it could benefit.
12
In equilibrium a winning firm having to choose at time
t+1 where to locate production must be indifferent between A









++ ++ = 11 11 . Under the assumption of equalisation of nominal
wages between the two regions, manufacturing firms must all






= ; in each region the
number of unskilled workers is therefore proportional to the
number of firms:  LL t
A
tt =l . Assuming that all the R&D firms
locate in region A (as mentioned earlier, a perfectly
symmetric equilibrium is possible with all the R&D firms





























The shape of equation (15) is studied in Appendix 2. It
is demonstrated that a sufficient condition to have complete
concentration of all economic activities in one region (Figure
1) is that the transport costs are high relative to the




2, so that the centripetal force
prevails. On the other hand, if the transport costs are
sufficiently low with respect to the congestion costs,


















, the economy is split into two regions of
                                                       
12 This is also true in all cases of asymmetric equilibria, which are
only possible if there are differences in the nominal wages of
skilled workers between the two regions.22
unequal size (Figure 2). This equilibrium must necessarily be
asymmetric: for a given number of goods produced in region A,
higher congestion costs must be paid by people living in that
region, owing to the presence of workers employed in research
firms; this utility loss must be compensated by a lower price
level, which is possible only if more than half of the goods
are produced in that region. On the other hand, consumers in
region B will spend a larger share of their income on paying
the transport costs on goods produced in A, but they will also
benefit from lower congestion costs.
3.2.2 Production in the region where the winning firm
conducted R&D
When the firm that won the technology race cannot
locate production in a region different from where it
conducted research (for example because close contacts must be
kept between the research laboratories and the shop floor) the






























As before, profits are an increasing function of the
number of research firms within the same industry locating in
the same region; each industry’s research activity must
therefore locate within the same region.
13
From equation (16) it is clear that in equilibrium all







In each region the number of unskilled workers is therefore
                                                       
13 Although profits also increase with the number of industries locating
at least one research firm in that region, R&D firms cannot locate
all in the same region because research and production in the same
industry must locate within the same region.23
proportional to the number of firms:  LL t
A
tt =l . Moreover, the
number of skilled workers at time t must be proportional to
that of industries at time t-1:  HH t
A
tt = - l 1 . Assuming that in
equilibrium the location of production does not change from t


























As is shown in Appendix 2, there are three possible
types of equilibria: complete concentration of economic
activities in one region (Figure 1), asymmetric distribution
of economic activities (Figure 3) and symmetric distribution
of economic activities in the two regions. The condition for a
polarised equilibrium is the same as in the case of separation









is a sufficient condition to have a symmetric distribution,
which is never possible when firms are not vertically
integrated.
4. Welfare, income distribution and integration
The welfare implications of the analysis are quite
straightforward. Workers are utility maximisers, free to move
from one region to the other: their choice is therefore always
optimal. Analogously, firms are profit maximisers and they
internalise the effects of spillovers on their location
choices. Whatever the overall geographical equilibrium, it is
therefore the result of an optimal choice for the given level
of parameters.
On the other hand, the possibility of separating
research and production has a significant impact on welfare,
by making it possible to fully exploit the spillovers in R&D24
activity, and therefore increasing the rate of growth in total
output. This also has an impact on income distribution between
the two regions. From the profit function in equations (14)
and (16), under the assumption of nominal wage equalisation,
it is possible to solve for the equilibrium relationship


































If, as is likely, the wage of skilled workers is higher
than that of unskilled workers,
15 the concentration of
research has the effect of making income distribution between
the regions more uneven in per capita terms as well.
16
Two effects that it is possible to expect from
integration between two regions are the reduction of the needs
for vertical integration between research and production (for
example as information can be transmitted more quickly and
efficiently) and the decrease of the transport costs. From the
                                                       
14 From equations (4), (6), (8) and (10), and the equilibrium condition












































. From equation (18) it is also true that Wt
H  is
constant, as stated earlier. Finally, substituting into the budget
constraint (1) it is possible to solve for the initial level of
agents’ wealth, a0. A similar relationship could be derived for the
case in which nominal wages are not equalised between regions.
15 This condition is satisfied when the share of unskilled workers and
the number of industries are large, and when the number of research


































, where  ~ Et
S  is the average expenditure of a worker in
region S. Obviously, in absolute terms a larger region has a higher
level of total consumption.25
previous section it is clear that the possibility of
separating research and production has the effect of
increasing the asymmetries between the two regions, owing to
the effect of feedback and feedforward mechanisms associated
with the clustering of R&D. In fact, if an equilibrium with
economic activities spread in both regions is preserved, it
cannot be symmetric. On the other hand, the decrease of the
transport costs reduces the centripetal forces and therefore
makes it possible to sustain an equilibrium in which
production is more evenly spread between the two regions. The
final effect of integration depends on which of the two forces
prevails.
5. Conclusions
Many empirical studies have found the existence of both
inter-industry and intra-industry externalities in the form of
local knowledge spillovers in research. This paper has made
some assumptions reflecting these empirical regularities in
order to analyse their implications for the allocation of
economic activities between two regions.
The basic framework of the model is common to the new
economic geography literature: the centripetal force is
represented by the cost of transporting goods form one region
to the other, which makes it more attractive for workers to
locate where the larger share of consumption goods is produced
(in order to minimise the payment of the transport costs). The
centrifugal force is represented by congestion costs, which
are assumed to increase with the number of workers living in a
region. The existence of positive technological spillovers
between research firms located in the same region is shown to
affect the location of economic activities only when research
and production can take place in different regions. However,
when firms are not vertically integrated, the clustering of26
the R&D activity which results from the presence of spillovers
introduces a centripetal force, favouring regional
polarisation. This force is a result of both feedback and
feedforward mechanisms: consumers living in an area which is
more crowded owing to the presence of skilled workers employed
in research (in addition to the unskilled workers employed in
manufacturing) must get a compensation, which can only derive
from a lower price level, and can therefore be obtained only
by reducing the share of goods on which transport costs must
be paid: more than half of the consumption goods must then be
produced in that region. Equilibrium is reached when the
benefit of having one more good produced in the region is
offset by the loss associated with the presence of the workers
that produce it.
If the integration between two regions or countries is
seen to determine a reduction in the transport costs as well
as in the degree of vertical integration within firms, the
overall effect on regional equilibrium is uncertain. In fact,
the former effect determines an incentive for unskilled
workers and manufacturing firms to migrate to the less
populated region, where the congestion costs are lower. The
latter determines the clustering of the research sector in one
region, thus introducing a centripetal force that favours an
asymmetric distribution of activities.
This clustering also implies the possibility of fully
exploiting the positive spillovers in research, thus
determining an increase in the rate of growth of the economy.
However, it also has the effect of determining an uneven
distribution of per capita income: if the nominal wages of
skilled workers are higher, the region which hosts the R&D
sector is richer than the other.Appendix 1
Consider the case of a leading manufacturing firm
producing in region A. If nominal wages are not equalised,
this firm can sell its good in both regions only if it fixes a
price that satisfies condition (8) and that is lower than that
guaranteeing zero profits to a non-winning firm in region B,
augmented for the transport costs: PiPi t
A
t
B () ()<t. Substituting
equation (8) into the previous condition, it becomes clear




LB,, () ()>t, the leading firm would prefer to move its
production. The same reasoning applies for manufacturing firms
locating in B. Therefore, the following relationships between
nominal wages must be always satisfied in order to have













profit maximisation this implies that there is also a
relationship between the number of unskilled workers employed
in production in each region. Substituting the two boundary
conditions obtained from the previous expression into (12), it
























































Consider first the case when research and manufacturing
firms are not vertically integrated. Defining for simplicity

























l ,  ()f t l and  ()f t 'l














º, it is easy to show that  ()f t 'l>0 for
































































0,  ()f t 'l<0 for  ()ll t Î0, ,
()f t 'l>0 for  ( ) lll t Î, $  and  ()f t 'l  is either positive or negative
for  ( ) ll t Î $ ,1, where 01<<<ll $ . The possible equilibria are as




2,  ()f00<,  ()f10> and therefore  ()"f t 'l
()f t l can only cross the x-axis once and from below; the only
stable equilibrium is thus with complete concentration of
economic activities in one region; any equilibrium with
activities spread in both regions where ()f t l crosses the x-
axis from below is unstable because workers deciding to move
would have a higher real wage adjusted for the congestion




















































 []"ÎLH tt ,,01, so that  ()f t 'l<0 "lt  and
therefore ()f t l can only cross the x-axis once and from above;29
the only stable equilibrium is thus with activities spread in

























2   ( ) f 00 < ,  () f10 <
and  ( ) f t ' l can either be positive or negative depending on the
values of l t , so that  () f t l could never cross the x-axis or
could cross it twice; there could thus be either one stable
equilibrium with complete concentration or one stable
equilibrium with activities spread in both regions.
Second, consider the case when research and manufacturing
firms are vertically integrated. Defining for simplicity






















l ,  () g t l and  () g t ' l are














º , it is
easy to show that  () g t ' l> 0  for  ( ) logtl > i t  and that  () i t l  has a
minimum for lt =
1
2
 and a maximum for lt = 0 or lt =1. Therefore,











;  () g t ' l> 0   "lt  if and
















0  ,  () g t ' l< 0  for  () ll t Î 0, ,
() g t ' l> 0  for  ( ) ll l t Î , $  and  () g t ' l either positive or negative for
( ) ll t Î $ ,1 , where 01 <<< ll $ . The possible equilibria are therefore




2 ,  () g00 < ,  () g10 >  and therefore
() " g t ' l  () g t l can only cross the x-axis once and from below; the
only stable equilibrium is thus with complete concentration of





,  () g00 > ,








log  so that  () g t ' l< 0   "lt  and therefore  () g t l30
can only cross the x-axis once and from above; the only stable
equilibrium is thus with activities spread in both regions;













  ( ) g 00 > ,  ( ) g 10 <  and  () g t ' lcan be either
positive or negative depending on the values of lt  so that
() g t l could cross the x-axis either once or three times;
therefore there could be either one stable symmetric
equilibrium or two stable asymmetric equilibria and in both
cases activities would be spread in both regions.
In the case in which nominal wages are not equalised, the
conditions for determining the signs of  () f0,  () f1,  () g0 and  () g1
are different from the previous ones, while those for
determining the signs of  () f t ' l and  () g t ' l are unchanged.








, it is possible to identify the





2 there can be only one
stable equilibrium, with activities concentrated; (ii) for


































  there can be only one stable
























÷ log log  there can be either one stable






















÷ << log log
1
1
3  there can be only one stable
equilibrium, with activities concentrated; (v) for










































2  there can be either one31
stable equilibrium, with activities concentrated, or one
stable equilibrium, with activities spread.
When research and manufacturing are not vertically
integrated and WW t
LA
t
LB =t  it is possible to identify the































can be only one stable equilibrium with activities








































 there can be only one stable equilibrium, with
























































 there can be either one stable equilibrium
or two stable equilibria, with activities spread; (iv) for






















































































 there can be only one stable
equilibrium, with activities concentrated; (v) for



























































































 there can be either one stable
equilibrium, with activities concentrated, or one stable
equilibrium, with activities spread.








 or WW t
LA
t
LB =t  it is possible to32






can be only one stable equilibrium, with activities















 there can be only
one stable equilibrium, with activities spread; (iii) for























 there can be
only one stable equilibrium, with activities concentrated;


































 there can be
either one stable equilibrium, with activities concentrated,
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